Firewalls are a fundamental element of network security systems with the ability to block network data traffic flows according to pre-defined rules. Software-defined networking (SDN) technology, which can provide flexibility, elasticity, and programmability for network management, has been applied to network security systems. We propose a software-defined firewall cyber-security system, which securely gathers the firewall rules of the host/network-based firewalls through the SDN control plane, converts the collected firewall rules in the form of SDN flow rules, and deploys them on OpenFlow (OF)-enabled switches. Furthermore, we formulate an optimization problem to find appropriate OF-enabled switches to which the SDN flow rules are to be sent. The proposed firewall system makes the traffic flows that are destined to be dropped by a firewall be dropped in advance at the OF-enabled switch with the corresponding SDN flow rules. The SDN-based testbed experiments demonstrate that the proposed firewall system reduces the aggregate network traffic volume and the resource utilization of end-hosts in the network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Firewalls are a network security system widely used for filtering inbound and outbound data traffic to protect a host or network system from network anomalies and malicious attacks. A firewall monitors data traffic to filter suspicious or malicious traffic based on the security policy and firewall rules defined by the network administrator. A firewall is classified as a host-based or a network-based, depending on its location. A host-based firewall detects attacks within a specific host located at the network edge, while a network-based firewall is located at the ingress backbone point and inspects data traffic to filter suspicious traffic flows or malicious activities. According to how to inspect packets, the firewall is classified as follows:
• A packet-filtering firewall, which is the most basic type of firewall system, compares packets with a packetfiltering firewall rule, such as a protocol, internet protocol (IP) address, and port number.
Multiple firewall systems are required for large-scale network traffic inspection since a firewall has traffic inspection capability limitations due to network processor speed, memory capacity, and power consumption [1] - [4] . Numerous studies have focused on the deployment of firewalls [5] - [8] . Two typical approaches for firewall placement include edge filtering and ingress filtering:
• Edge filtering places firewall systems on the network edge for traffic monitoring. This case requires large number of network devices, and data traffic must be forwarded from ingress to edge for firewall inspection, potentially increasing aggregate data traffic in the network.
• Ingress filtering is packet filtering that places firewall systems on the ingress points of the core router backbone for centralized management. The ingress filtering can reduce aggregate data traffic by filtering the traffic out as soon as it arrives rather than sending it over to the edge. However, ingress filtering requires higher firewall processing capability to process traffic due to more number of flows passing through ingress switches than edge switches.
The deployment of firewall issues due to the inflexibility of legacy networks can be resolved by software-defined networking (SDN) technology, which supports flexible, resilient, and programmable networks by separating the network control plane and the data plane. Under the SDN, communication between the SDN controller and switches is established through a secure control plane, and the switches are managed by the SDN controller through an OpenFlow (OF) protocol [9] . With SDN, it is possible to selectively forward legitimate traffic to its destination while filtering anomalies and attacks in the network. Recently, SDN technology has been applied to firewall system design, which includes SDN-based firewalls [10] - [16] and SDN / network function virtualization (NFV)-based firewalls [17] - [20] . The NFV virtualizes hardware resources and supports the execution of virtual network functions (VNFs), such as routing, load balancing, and firewall [21] . For example, the SDN functions such as dynamic forwarding table update and data traffic steering can be utilized for packet-filtering firewall implementation for the switch and stateful inspection on a virtualized firewall using the VNF. Furthermore, packet-filtering firewalls can be implemented on OF-enabled switches using the forwarding table updated by the SDN controller without the deployment of additional hardware equipment [10] . The stateful packet inspection firewall can be implemented on an SDN-based network. The SDN controller gathers the connection state information by tracking incoming and outgoing packets over time using a dynamic state table [13] . Using the connection state information, a statistics-based stateful inspection can be implemented as a firewall application on the SDN controller. The NFV-VNF model [17] can be exploited for implementing stateful inspection firewalls. Although OF-enabled switches do not provide stateful inspection, a stateful inspection can be performed by redirecting data traffic from multiple switches to one of the stateful firewalls in VNF format, which can be dynamically created on demand.
In this paper, we develop a software-defined firewall system that flexibly and dynamically performs firewall operations using SDN functionality instead of individual firewalls. The system securely gathers the distributed firewall rules to the SDN controller and converts them into corresponding SDN flow rules. Depending on the network topology and routing information, the converted firewall rules are deployed as SDN flow rules at OF-enabled switches from the network core to the edge, to perform packet-filtering anywhere on the network. Then, the malicious data traffic drops at deployment points of firewall rules, which exist as the OF-enabled switch forwarding table. Because the malicious traffic is never forwarded to the destination hosts, the aggregate data traffic in the network is reduced. Moreover, the host resource utilization can be reduced because the hosts neither receive nor inspect packets that are dropped at the deployment points. Thus, we focus our attention on how to reduce the aggregate data traffic in the network, which depends on the deployment point decision with the limitation of the forwarding table capacity. We formulate this deployment problem of firewall rules as a binary optimization to obtain an optimal solution and propose a greedy algorithm to maximize the average, aggregate, and reduced-data traffic by adopting the proposed firewall system. Our proposed firewall system can be applied to any SDN-based network, including large-scaled software-defined data centers. In general, in a cloud data center, thousands of virtual machines and containers run on a number of physical servers, and all incoming data traffic is inspected by firewalls deployed in such a data center. If SDN-based or SDN/NFV-based firewalls are placed at wrong locations, a large amount of data traffic will be routed to its designated firewalls for packet inspection. In such a case, the data traffic in the data center increases, and it negatively impacts both the service performance and network resource utilization in the data center. Unfortunately, most existing work on the SDN-based and SDN/NFV-based firewalls did not provide a solution to mitigate the additional overhead incurred by the traffic forwarding toward the firewalls. Compared to the previous approaches, our proposed system securely collects the firewall rules from distributed firewall devices and finds suitable locations to deploy the collected firewall rules to reduce the aggregate data traffic in the data centers. Also, in the proposed firewall system, protecting firewall rule information is essential for network security, since attackers can easily identify vulnerabilities of a victim host if they obtain the firewall rule information of the host. This paper proposes how to securely collect the firewall rules from distributed firewalls in the network, and implements the secure collection of firewall rules using public-key cryptography and SDN functionalities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we provide a survey of related works. In Section III, we present the software-defined firewall cybersecurity system that securely gathers the firewall rules of host/network-based firewalls, converts them into SDN flow rules, and deploys them on OF-enabled switches in the SDN-based network. In Section IV, we formulate the deployment problem of firewall rules to maximize the reduction of aggregate data traffic volume, and then propose a greedy algorithm to solve the deployment problem. In Section V and VI, we provide simulation results of different network topologies and experimental results on a real SDN testbed. Finally, in Section VII, We summarize our work and dicuss future research.
II. RELATED WORKS A. FIREWALL PLACEMENT
As the networks increase in terms of their size and complexity, an individual firewall that inspects data traffic at a fixed network entry point can become a performance bottleneck. Also, it is not possible to perform packet filtering at every network entry point. Smith and Bhattacharya considered a firewall placement problem to protect large-scale networks [5] . They proposed firewall chaining that could be placed in a firewall cascade, i.e., the path between a potential attack point and a network node with sensitive data. Ioannidis et al. proposed a concept of a distributed firewall in [6] . Firewalls are distributed on every end-host and enforce a centrally declared policy in a topology independent manner. They presented the design and implementation of the distributed and hostbased firewall. Yuan et al. introduced FIREMAN, which is a static analysis toolkit for checking the configuration of multiple firewalls through a firewall modeling and analysis [7] . FIREMAN can check misconfigurations such as policy violations, inconsistencies, and inefficiencies in individual and distributed firewalls. Furthermore, Lee et al. proposed a firewall deployment for virtual machines in a cloud data center environment to overcome link congestion issues since the latency in the data center depends on link congestion [8] . They proposed an appropriate firewall deployment subject to a bandwidth constraint on links.
B. SDN-BASED CYBER-SECURITY
Mattos and Duarte proposed a host authentication based-access control mechanism called AuthFlow in the data-link layer using SDN, which focuses on achieving SDN-based network security by preventing unauthorized hosts [22] . In [23] , Wang et al. proposed a novel SDN controller scheduling algorithm to mitigate a network from denial of service (DoS) attacks using bandwidth prediction. Moreover, Ai et al. proposed a correlation-aware dynamic instance switching (CDIS) technique using SDN [24] . CDIS monitors instances that handle routing logic for the SDN controller, divides the total time into multiple slots, and changes the routing instance in each time slot to reduce attack sustainability. In [25] , a vulnerability-aware heterogeneous network devices assignment (VHNDA) is proposed to restrict the propagation of malicious traffic in a network. VHNDA distributes diverse variants, which are various implementations of the same functionality, to network nodes to limit the propagation of malicious traffic. In [26] , a novel distributed SDN security framework for multi-level flow monitoring named TENNISON is proposed. TENNISON can monitor a large number of flows and perform deep packet inspection (DPI) on selected flows. Also, Scott-Hayward and Arumugam proposed a security solution for a data plane named OFMTL-SEC, which is devised to protect a network against both the SDN configuration-based attacks and address resolution protocol (ARP) spoofing [27] . This leverages the OF multi-table implementation and provides scalable security solutions without affecting the network performance. In [28] , Dargahi et al. reviewed security issues for a programmable data plane in SDN. They pointed out significant security problems caused by the inherent properties of existing stateful SDN schemes.
C. SDN-BASED FIREWALLS
Hu et al. proposed the SDN-based firewall called FLOWGUARD, which is a comprehensive framework that checks the network flow path and conflicts between firewalls and flow rules for dynamically changing the SDN-based network [10] . Muthukumaran and Chinnappan proposed a software defined firewall (SDF) that creates an association firewall rule to detect network anomalies and makes the OF-enabled switch act as an intrusion detection system [11] . Phatak et al. proposed an SDN-based firewall using open source solutions [12] . It provides network security by utilizing the capabilities of OF for blocking unwanted traffic. The SDN-based firewall rules are created based on the match fields, which are specified in the OF protocol. They implemented the SDN-based firewall application on the top of the SDN controller. It continually monitors access control lists installed on OF-enabled switches to prevent them from being modified by external or internal systems. Zerkane et al. [13] proposed a novel stateful firewall solution FlowTracker, which reduces controller processing overhead caused by communication overhead between control and data planes. It also focuses on maintaining the accuracy and agility of multiple stateful firewalls. Dixit et al. [14] identified various metrics for SDN-based firewalls in enterprise network environments. They evaluated seven different SDN-based firewalls for these metrics and proposed possible mitigation methods. They also performed a case study for the FLOWGUARD on a large-scale and complex demilitarized zone network to discover the vulnerabilities of SDN-based firewalls. Nguyen et al. presented a survey on the problem of placing SDN flow rules in [15] . They addressed two major issues of the SDN flow rule placement problem: memory limitation of flow table size in the OF-enabled switch and signaling overhead of OF messages for installing or updating flow rules, and discussed existing solutions for these two challenges. Furthermore, Wei et al. proposed a fine-grained rule partition (FRP) algorithm that reduces the number of firewall rules managed by each virtual machine (VM) with resource constraints in a data center [16] . The algorithm first creates a map of source and destination IP address pairs of the virtual machines in the data center and generates a set of accept rules that are merged without conflict. The set of accept rules is called a redirection rule and is moved to an adjacent switch of the virtual machines.
D. SDN/NFV-BASED FIREWALLS
Deng et al. proposed the SDN/NFV-based firewall called VNGuard by creating virtual firewalls using VNF [17] . They manage the virtual firewalls through the SDN/NFV functions to protect virtual networks in the cloud virtual network environment. They provided a high-level firewall rule language for virtual network users who may not understand the actual network configuration. Since all firewall rules cannot be put in one virtual firewall due to performance issues, scalable and effective distribution of user-specific firewall policies using virtual firewall controllers are essential. Deng and Li [18] proposed a firewall policy distribution for the improvement of virtual firewall performance and VNF resource management. In [19] , Lorenz et al. analyzed the pros and cons of SDN and SDN/NFV-based approaches for firewalls and proposed a hybrid architecture using both SDN-based and NFV-based firewalls. They presented some challenges associated with both firewalls to control plane security and performance limitations. Bouet et al. [20] considered using DPI engines, which can be deployed in VNF format on general-purpose hardware using NFV technology. Because the deployment of DPI engines is expensive in terms of license cost and power consumption, they proposed a genetic algorithm based DPI engine deployment method to trade off the minimum number of DPI engines against the minimum network load under the operational and throughput constraints.
Although most existing SDN-and SDN/NFV-based firewall research have focused only on network information, our proposed firewall system exploits both network and host information to deploy distributed firewalls at the switches on the SDN-based network. It devises a public key based system to gather firewall information from the distributed host or network-based firewalls using SDN functionality. The proposed system formulates the placement problem to maximize the reduction of aggregate data traffic volume in the network for the deployment of firewall rules, unlike previous works. Furthermore, it attempts to mitigate the performance degradation due to the SDN flow matching processing by distributing the flow rules over the switches.
III. THE SOFTWARE-DEFINED FIREWALL CYBER-SECURITY SYSTEM
We devise a software-defined firewall cyber-security system on an SDN-based network. The proposed system securely collects all distributed packet-filtering firewall rules through the SDN control plane and converts them into SDN flow rules. The firewall rules are represented in the form of SDN flow rules for the flow table of OF-enabled switches. Thus, after the conversion of all firewall rules, the proposed firewall system selects deployment points, namely, switches to deploy SDN flow rules using the OF protocol. The SDN flow rules act as packet classifiers to process packets that belong to the same flow and perform a pre-defined action, namely, drop and forward for implementing firewall operations.
Notably, the proposed firewall system can reduce the traffic volume in the network because the traffic flows destined to be dropped by a firewall are dropped in advance at the OF-enabled switch with the corresponding SDN flow rule. The data traffic from an external network can be filtered by SDN flow rules without being forwarded to the firewalls for an inspection. Besides, since the host firewall does not need to inspect the data traffic in the kernel space of the operating system, the host resource consumption is also decreased. Figure 1 shows the proposed firewall system architecture on an SDN-based network, which consists of firewall devices, OF-enabled switches, and a firewall manager on an SDN controller. The proposed system operates according to the following three processes: i) secure collection of firewall rules, ii) conversion of firewall rules, and iii) deployment of firewall rules. The first process distributes a public key, generated by the firewall manager on the SDN controller, to all firewall devices through the secure control plane. For collecting the encrypted firewalls, every firewall performs encryption of their firewall rules using the public key and sends encrypted rules to the firewall manager. Then, the collected encrypted firewall rules are decrypted using the private key owned by the firewall manager. The decrypted firewall rules are converted into SDN flow rules. It is important to maintain their semantics and to create the smallest set of SDN flow rules to protect all hosts on the network. Finally, the deployment process of firewall rules sends SDN flow rules to suitable switches to perform firewall operations with the aggregate data traffic reduced.
A. SECURE COLLECTION OF FIREWALL RULES
We propose the public key based system that can gather firewall information from distributed firewalls using SDN functionalities. Although the OF protocol provides limited host information such as location, IP, and media access control (MAC) addresses, the firewall rules are not accessible through the OpenFlow protocol. Another challenge is that the firewall information ought to be securely protected since it is possible to bypass the firewall and infect the host by exploiting the vulnerabilities of the host if a malicious user seizes firewall information.
To safely gather firewalls, the firewall manager on the SDN controller creates a message for the distribution of the public key to OF-enabled switches that are directly connected to the firewall through a secure control plane. We first generate private and public keys by Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) cryptosystem, which is widely used for secure data transmission. Once the public key is generated, it is distributed through the control plane and is used for encrypting the firewall rules. We use Python Crypto library for RSA encryption and decryption of firewall rules.
The SDN controller can use a 'Packet-Out' message (OFPT_PACKET_OUT) to inject raw packets into the data plane of a particular switch via the control plane. That is, the SDN controller can inject packets into an OF-enabled switch and instruct packets to be sent out on a specific physical port [29] . In the yet another next generation (YANG) model, which is an internet engineering task force standard for modeling network element configuration, the Opendaylight SDN controller is supported to send a raw packet out through an OF-enabled switch from the SDN controller with a remote procedure call (RPC) interface transmit-packet. To deliver the public key from the SDN controller to end-hosts through the control plane, we use the 'Packet-Out' message using the RPC interface transmit-packet supported by a packet-processing service of the Opendaylight. The packetprocessing service is provided by a model-flow-service, which is one of OF plugins. The RPC interface transmitpacket has three input fields such as egress, node, and rawpacket. Egress is the egress port of the OF-enabled switch, node is the switch to which the packet is sent, and raw-packet is the raw packet data to be sent. Here, the base64 encoding, which converts 8-bit binary data into a series of strings consisting only characters in the common ASCII, must be applied to the binary raw packet data when calling the interface. We use SCAPY Python package to generate raw-packet encapsulating a public key.
Once the message for public key distribution is received through the control plane, the switch forwards the public key directly to the connected firewall. Then, each firewall encrypts the firewall rules using the public key and sends the encrypted firewall rules to the firewall manager through the data plane using a representational state transfer (REST) interface, which is an architectural attribute based on the hyper text transfer protocol (HTTP). The firewall manager on the SDN controller receives encrypted firewall rules and performs decryption using the private key. The firewall manager updates the public key and broadcasts it to every firewall device periodically and whenever it detects changes in the topology information such as newly added or deleted hosts, using a link layer discovery protocol.
B. CONVERSION OF FIREWALL RULES
Generally, since every OF-enabled switch has limited resources, it is important to reduce the number of SDN flow rules. After the decryption, the proposed firewall system minimizes the total number of SDN flow rules corresponding to firewall rules without altering their security policy. We define the firewall rule as a packet classifier rule with six input fields (i.e., source IP address, destination IP address, source port, destination port, protocol, and action) as shown in Table 1 , which we used to process incoming packets according to the value in each field. To place firewall rules (e.g., Iptables and Netfilter firewall rules) into the OF-enabled switch, we converted the firewall rule into a ternary content addressable memory (TCAM) for the flow rule of the forwarding table in the switch. For creating the SDN flow rules corresponding to firewall rules, it is needed to convert firewall rules into TCAM entries. TCAMs require predicates for packet classification to be represented in a ternary format (i.e., 0, 1, and *). When converting existing packet classifier rules, such as port number fields, into TCAM entries, the number of TCAM entries increases sharply because a range-type rule predicate is expressed as a set of prefixes, and each prefix requires one separate TCAM entry. We present the three fields of the packet classifier rule predicate, source, and destination IP addresses and protocol type in the ternary format immediately. For example, 1.2.3.0/24 would contain 8 '*' at the end of the ternary format, and it can be stored directly in the TCAM entry. The remaining two fields of source and destination port numbers may contain a range of integer values such as [1, 65534] in r1 in Table 1 . In this case, the ranges must be expressed as a union of prefixes to be stored in TCAMs. For example, the range [3, 13] of a 4-bit field is expanded to 0011, 01**, 10**, and 110*. In the worst-case, (2W − 2) prefixes are needed to represent the W -bit field as discussed in [30] . This leads to the wellknown range expansion problem, which further worsens the limited TCAM capacity issue by significantly increasing the number of TCAM entries when converting the rule predicate into a ternary format. Note that it is reported that OF-enabled switches have a limited capacity of about 16K TCAM entries in [31] .
Many studies have focused on minimizing firewall rule sets while preserving their policies when converting firewall rules into the corresponding TCAM entries [3] , [4] . We adopt the existing firewall rule conversion methods of TCAM Razor [3] and Bit Weaving [4] to minimize the number of TCAM entries while preserving the semantics of existing firewall rules. Furthermore, outbound traffic rules are excluded by the firewall manager when firewall rules are converted into SDN flow rules. If the outbound rules are deployed at switches, the traffic should be forwarded to the corresponding switch for firewall inspection, so that the aggregate data traffic in the network can be minimized by processing it immediately when it occurs on the host. After the conversion of all firewall rules, the proposed system creates SDN flow rules according to the destination addresses of converted firewall rules. In other words, every firewall on the network has its own software-defined firewall, namely, the converted firewall rules for each firewall in the form of SDN flow rules of the OF-enabled switch.
C. DEPLOYMENT OF FIREWALL RULES
Based on the limited capacity of the switches, a switch does not process all flow rules if it has too many firewall rules, which may increase the traffic processing time. Note that TCAM takes O(1) search time to find the decision for packet matches. On the other hand, excessively distributed firewalls may increase the aggregate data traffic volume across the network because the traffic flows are steered to the firewall for inspection. Therefore, the firewall rules should be distributed appropriately across multiple switches. To select deployment points, the proposed firewall system chooses switches based on the resource usage of the switches and the aggregate data traffic in the network, of which information can be collected from the SDN controller. The firewalls are deployed using the converted firewall rules. To maximize the reduction of aggregate data traffic volume in the network, an optimization problem is formulated in the next section.
IV. OPTIMIZING DEPLOYMENT OF FIREWALL RULES
We consider the optimization of the firewall rule deployment scheme to maximize the reduction of aggregate data traffic volume in the network. In an SDN-based network, TCAM entries in an OF-enabled switch are the essential resource for expediting data forwarding from ingress switches to hosts. Due to a limited TCAM switch entries, it is impossible to deploy all firewall rules on a single switch. The firewalls are to be distributed appropriately over switches to protect all hosts in the network effectively. Most of the flows from the external network to the hosts can go through fewer ingress switches connected to the internal. Contrarily, proportionally fewer flows go through edge switches directly connected to the host. For example, in Figure 2 , two flows, f 1 and f 2 , enter ingress switch s 1 , and only one flow passes through edge switch s 4 .
Hence, if more firewalls are deployed at the ingress switches, the aggregate data traffic, flowing through the network, can be reduced to allow data traffic to be filtered as soon as it arrives at the ingress switch rather than to forward it to the host. However, if excessive firewalls are placed on an ingress switch, the switch cannot process data traffic because of its limited capacity, making the ingress switch become a bottleneck and causing possible network delays. If firewalls are distributed relatively more to edge switches, then, the burden of TCAM entry usage at the ingress switches is smaller. Still, aggregate data traffic in the network can increase because data traffic must be forwarded from the ingress switch to the edge switches for firewall inspection. Thus, we consider an optimization strategy to maximize the reduction of aggregate data traffic volume in the network according to the deployment of firewall rules when the TCAM entry capacity of each switch is limited. We shall discuss this in detail in the following subsections.
A. PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT SCHEME OF FIREWALL RULES
As shown in Figure 2 , we consider a network that consists of n hosts, m flows, and l OF-enabled switches. The OF-enabled switches are operated by the SDN controller. Let N denote a set of hosts, where its element n i is the i-th host in the network. Let F denote a set of flows, where its element f j is the j-th flow in the network. Let S denote a set of switches, whose element s k denotes the k-th switch in the network. Let x i,k ∈ {0, 1} denote a deployment index of firewall rules for the host n i at the switch s k . If the firewall rules for n i are deployed at s k according to x i,k , the flows can be filtered by the firewall rules at s k and do not go through the next switches following s k on the path of the flows.
The objective of the deployment scheme is to maximize the reduction of aggregate data traffic volume in the network. Let X denote a binary decision set, whose element is x i,k . Let g(X) denote the reduction of aggregate data traffic volume in accordance with x i,k for all hosts and switches in the network. Then, g(X) is given by
where path(j) is a set of switches on path of the flow f j , dst(j) is the destination host of the j-th flow, hop(s k → dst(j)) is the number of hops from the k-th switch to the destination host of the flow f j , and r j is the data rate of the j-th flow. In (1), the term of hop(s k → dst(j))·r j represents the expected reduction of data traffic volume when the flow f j is dropped at s k by the firewall rules for n i ; otherwise, it is zero. In Figure 2 , if the firewall rules for n i drop f j at s k , then f j does not pass through s k+1 , s k+3 and s k+5 to n i . Therefore, data traffic to n i is decreased by 4r j as compared with the case where the flow is inspected by the firewall on host n i .
The optimal binary decision problem to find X * that maximizes g(X) is formulated as follows:
subject to the following constraints:
x dst(j),k = 1 for ∀f j ∈ F,
where w i is the number of SDN flow rules corresponding to firewall rules for the i-th host, and c k is the processing capacity of the k-th switch. Note that c k is bounded by the maximum number of TCAM entries that the switch can properly process without significant degradation in the processing performance. Due to the limited capacity of switch, the total number of SDN flow rules on the switch cannot exceed the capacity of the switch, and the firewall rules for the destination host of the j-th flow should be placed on only one of the switches in the path(j) because deploying redundant firewall rules at multiple switches on the path wastes the switch's TCAM entries.
B. GREEDY DEPLOYMENT OF FIREWALL RULES
The optimization problem in (2) is to find the binary decision set to maximize the reduction of aggregate data traffic. This problem can be solved using a deterministic combinatorial algorithm. A brute-force search algorithm that enumerates all possible candidates and checks whether each candidate satisfies the problem constraints can be used to solve this problem. However, the brute-force method is not scalable because the complexity grows exponentially with respect to dimension X * . Thus, it is limited in applicability to small network topologies with only a few tens of n i and s k . To make this binary optimization problem more tractable, we propose a greedy algorithm based on the best-fit decreasing method using the most straightforward heuristic algorithm. The detailed procedure of the proposed greedy deployment scheme of firewall rules is given as Algorithm 1. For initialization, Algorithm 1 sets X * to the empty set. In the main loop, the algorithm selects indexes for r j and s k so that the product (hop(s k → dst(j)) · r j ) has the largest value and sets x dst(j),k to one. Then, the first constraint on s k is checked on line 7 to examine the resource availability of the switch. Because the firewall rules for the destination host of the j-th flow can reduce resource consumption by filtering Algorithm 1 Proposed Greedy Deployment of Firewall Rules Require: N, F, S, path(j), w i , c k 1: // Initialization 2: X * = φ; 3: // Main loop 4: while the largest hop(s k → dst(j)) · r j > 0 do 5: Select j and k with the largest hop(s k → dst(j)) · r j 6:
x dst(j),k = 1; 7: if n i ∈N x i,k · w i ≤ c k then 8: if s k ∈path(j) x dst(j),k = 1 then 9: X * = X * ∪ x dst(j),k ; 10: hop(s k → dst(j)) = 0; 11: c k = c k − w dst(j) ; 12: Go back to line 5.
13:
end if 14: end if 15: x dst(j),k = 0; 16: hop(s k → dst(j)) = 0; 17: end while packets at only one s k of path(j), the algorithm examines the second constraint on line 8.
If the firewall rules for the destination host of the j-th flow can be deployed at s k , x dst(j),k becomes the element of X * , hop(s k → dst(j)) · r j is set to zero, and c k is decreased by w dst (j) . Finally, the algorithm goes back to line 5 to determine the next deployment of firewall rules. The algorithm will approximate the optimal binary decision set by repeating the operations in the loop from lines 5 through 16 until it tries all possible candidates in the loop. In a large-sized network topology with a number of firewalls, the number of firewall rules might be too large to be handled by a single SDN controller because of the limited capability of SDN controller. Also, the data exchange on the SDN control plane increases and consumes a lot of the control plane bandwidth. For the scalability issue, a hierarchical management architecture with multiple SDN controllers can be used for large-sized networks in practice. Alternatively, we can deploy only a subset of firewall rules instead of the entire set of firewall rules for all the flows on the network by simply replacing the second constraint in (3) with s k ∈path(j) x dst(j),k ≤ 1 for ∀f j ∈ F. However, in this case, the firewall rules that are not deployed on the SDN switches should be enforced individually at the original firewalls.
In this paper, we convert a set of firewall rules for an individual host into a set of SDN flow rules, and decide a suitable OF-enabled switch for each set of SDN flow rules using (2). However, it is possible to further reduce the number of SDN flow rules on the SDN-based network using network topology and routing information. For example, the same deny rule for multiple hosts can be expressed in a single SDN flow rule and be deployed at a common switch on the paths to the hosts. This approach can further reduce the total number of TCAM entries on the SDN-based network. It is worth noting that two or more firewall rules on the same network path may conflict with each other when exclusively different packet filtering rules are imposed on the same traffic flow. In Figure 2 , for example, suppose that n 1 has rule4 on Table 1 , and rule4 is deployed at s 1 . In addition, n 2 has rule5, and rule5 is deployed at s 5 . If a flow destined to n 2 matches with rule5, it is dropped by rule4 at s 1 and is not forwarded to n 2 . These collisions among firewalls can be detected using existing schemes such as Firewall Policy Advisor [32] . Then, for resolving these inter-firewall conflicts, we place conflicting SDN flow rules at the same switch with a different priority field. For example, rule4 and rule5 are deployed at the same switch with a different priority field in the form of SDN flow rule according to the longest prefix match. We will further investigate on how to combine multiple SDN flow rules for different end-hosts in a compact form without inter-firewall conflicts as a part of future work.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
To evaluate the performance of the proposed deployment strategy of firewall rules, we performed simulations using the Python NetworkX library for generating network topologies. We evaluated the performance of the proposed method against three different topologies. In the simulation, the flows have an average data rate of 50 Mb/s, and their paths are changed arbitrarily in each iteration. We assume that the malicious flows, which will be blocked by firewall rules with denying action, are average 30% of total flows. The reported values are the averages of 100 different simulation runs we performed.
A. SIMPLE NETWORK
First, we considered a simple linear topology with three switches and six hosts to evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm. We measured a reduced data traffic ratio, which is defined by the ratio of total data traffic volume before and after the rule deployment. In this simple network scenario, we compared the proposed greedy algorithm to the three other schemes, which includes: an optimal deployment using a brute-force scheme, a random deployment of firewall rules, and the FRP deployment [16] . The optimal placement evaluates g(X) in (2) with all possible deployment candidates x i,k 's and selects one with the maximum value of g(X). In this simple scenario, the total candidate number of X is 2 18 . For the random deployment of firewall rules, we randomly deployed firewall rules of each host at one of the switches on the path of the flow toward the destination host. The FRP method generates redirection rules for a host using accept rules that can be merged without conflict, selects deny rules that can be merged into the redirection rules, and deploys them on the switch connected directly to the host. Figure 3 (a) shows the ratio of reduced data traffic volume with respect to the processing capacity of switches when the average number of firewall rules of each host is fixed to 50. If the capacity of switches is small, none of the schemes reduce the traffic volume on the network. As the capacity of switches exceeds 80, the network traffic volume is reduced and shows a discrepancy among the placement schemes of the firewall rule on the OF-switches. The optimal and random method reached the most 40% and 20% reduced data traffic ratio respectively. When the capacity of switches was 140, the proposed method achieved the most 37% reduced data traffic ratio because more firewall rules were preferentially placed on the switches with larger data traffic volume. For the FRP method, the reduced data ratio was increased by 30%. The reason that the FRP achieved lower performance is that it deploys the firewall rules at the nearest switches from each host. Furthermore, because the FRP method deploys outbound rules at switches, the outbound traffic flows are forwarded to the edge switches for firewall inspection and are dropped at the switches. This forwarding of the outbound traffic flows incurs additional traffic overhead between the hosts and switches. Figure 3 (b) shows the ratio of reduced data traffic volume as the average number of firewall rules of each host was increased from 50 to 140. The processing capacity of each switch was set to 100. The proposed method achieved better performance compared to the other methods when the number of firewall rules was less than 100. In the proposed method, more firewall rules were preferentially retained on the host as the number of firewall rules increased. As the number of firewall rules increases, the reduce traffic volume of all the methods becomes smaller because a relatively larger portion of firewall rules remain at the hosts due to the limited capacity of the switches.
B. LARGER-SCALED NETWORK
To evaluate the proposed deployment of the firewall rules for larger sized networks, we create two Barabási − Albert scale-free networks [33] , which have 800 and 1000 nodes as shown in Figure 4 (a) and 4(b), respectively. Each node represents an OF-enabled switch. The network is popularly called a scale-free network where each node is more likely to be attached to a node with a higher degree. In the simulation, we find 800 simple paths in the network with 800 switches in Figure 4 (a) and 1000 simple paths in the network with 1000 switches in Figure 4 (a) from a randomly selected source switch to a destination switch. A simple path is a path with no repeated switches. For each path, a host is connected to the source switch, and another host is connected to the destination switch. In the larger sized network scenario, we compared the proposed greedy algorithm to the host-based firewall and the random deployment of firewall rules. Figure 5 (a) shows the mean aggregate data traffic of the network as the processing capacity of each switch increases from 50 to 250 for a host-based firewall, a random deployment of firewall rules, and the proposed greedy deployment of firewall rules. Each firewall has an average of 25 firewall rules. In comparison with the host-based firewall, the proposed method reduced the aggregate data traffic by 12% and 26% when the switch capacity was 50 and 250 in the network with 1000 switches, respectively. The result demonstrates that the proposed method can achieve a higher degree of data traffic reduction in the network with a larger switch capacity when compared to the other methods. For the proposed method, the aggregate data traffic was decreased from 55 to 48 Tb/s in the network with 800 switches and 88 to 74 Tb/s in the network with 1000 switches as the switch capacity increased. It happened because more firewalls were deployed at core switches as the switch capacity increased. Figure 5 (c) show the mean aggregate data traffic and the mean resource utilization of switches as the total number of firewall rules was increased from 10K to 50K. The processing capacity of each switch was set to 300. The proposed method achieved significantly lower aggregate data traffic than the other methods. As the total number of firewall rules increased, the mean aggregate data traffic for the proposed method increased slightly. This is because it is not possible to deploy all the firewalls near the core switches if the number of firewalls is too large. As the total number of firewall rules increased, the mean resource utilization of switches increased because the capacity of switches was fixed, and more flow table entries were processed. The proposed method demonstrated lower mean resource utilization of switches because it dropped the malicious traffic flows at the core switches and had a lower degree of aggregate traffic volume in the network.
VI. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
To verify the proposed algorithm, we constructed a fattree topology SDN-based testbed, as shown in Figure 6(a) . Generally, the fat-tree is a three-layer topology with edge, aggregation, and core layers for a data center. It has an identical bandwidth at any bisections, and each layer has the same aggregated bandwidth [34] . The testbed consists of ten HP 2920 OF-enabled switches, two HP workstations (one workstation for the boron version of SDN controller and the other for the traffic generation), 12 Raspberry Pi hosts, and one malicious host with Kali Linux that generates malicious flows for synchronization (SYN) flood attack. The SYN flood attack is performed by sending a large number of TCP SYN packets to an attack target at short intervals, preventing the target from performing normal service. IPerf is used to generate normal data traffic, and Iptables is used as a host firewall. Iptables is a user-space application that allows system administrators to configure the Linux firewall tables by defining packet processing rules and their chains. In the experiment, the number of normal flows was set to 100, and the average data rate was 32 Mb/s. The number of the malicious flows performing SYN flood attack was increased from 2 to 6. Figure 6 (b) shows the rates of aggregated data traffic measured at the SDN controller. Initially, the normal and the malicious flows are generated by the traffic generator and a malicious host, respectively. Each Raspberry Pi host has its own firewall using Iptables. The SDN controller measures the rates of aggregate data traffic from OF-enabled switches and updates the flow table of each switch through the OpenFlow protocol and OpenDaylight REST API. The SDN controller receives encrypted host firewalls from hosts, calculates deployment points of firewall rules, and deploys them at the switches. The proposed deployment of firewall rules is stabilized in 10 seconds, as shown in Figure 6(b) . According to the proposed deployment of firewall rules, the malicious flows were dropped by the firewalls deployed at the core switches, and the flows were no longer forwarded to the hosts. The aggregate data traffic for the proposed method was decreased from 29 to 21 Gb/s when 6 malicious flows were generated. As the number of the malicious flows increased, the proposed deployment method of firewall rules achieved about 17 % to 28 % reduction of the aggregate data traffic volume, when it was deployed compared with the host firewall method.
It is also observed that the proposed method achieves lower computing resource utilization for hosts than using a method where each host has its own host firewall in the network configuration, as shown in Figure 6 (c). The average host CPU utilization of the proposed method was decreased from 13 to 3 % when 6 malicious flows were generated. As the number of the malicious flows was increased, the proposed deployment method of firewall rules achieved about 62 % to 77 % reduction of the mean host CPU utilization compared with the host firewall method. The flows directed to the hosts are inspected by firewalls deployed at the switches so that they are not inspected by the firewall on the hosts. Note that the reduction of traffic volume and CPU utilization is very critical for lowering the operating costs in a data center environment because the operating cost is determined by resource usage such as computing, networking, and storage.
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed a software-defined firewall system, which replaces local-host/network-based firewalls with distributed, flexible, SDN-flow rule-based firewall operations by using SDN functionality. Firewall rules are securely collected and converted into SDN flow rules to be deployed on OF-enabled switches while conserving the semantics of the firewall rules. We formulated the deployment problem of firewall rules as a combinatorial optimization that maximizes the reduction of aggregate data traffic volume when the capacity of the switch is limited. Also, we devised a greedy algorithm to deploy a set of firewalls to switch in the SDN-based network by using the information about the path and the number of hops that flows to hosts. Finally, we implemented the proposed firewall system on the empirical SDN testbed environment to demonstrate that the proposed system can reduce the computing and networking resources in a fat-tree SDN testbed topology. In the future, we hope to research on how to combine the SDN-flow rules for different hosts.
